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I 
M ili tary missions must be accomplished within a political and legal envi-ronment. One often indistinct and elusive but nonetheless important di-
mension of that environment is comprised of the expectations held by politically 
relevant actors (some of whom maybe far from the actual arena of operation) as to 
what constitutes or will constitute, in the circumstances, lawful action. Expecta-
tions which approve or disapprove a projected mission can be significant factors in 
determining the quantum of resources required for mission accomplishment or, 
indeed, in determining whether there will be a successful outcome. In some cases, 
these considerations may require adjustments in the mission's design or even its 
abandonment. 
It isa truism that it is wise to consult your lawyers before you act, for they are expert 
in identifying authori tative expectations. In international law, such consultations 
do not always help, because expectations with respect to the lawfulness of current 
or projected actions in the contemporary internationa] politica] system are not 
necessarily congruent with the stuff with which lawyers ordinarily work, the forma] 
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texts of international law. For one thing, the jurymen of international law, the cast 
of politically relevant actors, have expanded from a small group of nation-State 
elites who produce those texts. l It now includes a wide range of non-governmental 
actors, whose activities and influence are amplified by easy mobility and a global 
network of communications. For another, the texts of international law which are 
produced by nation-State elites vary in their effectiveness and the extent to which 
they reflect or shape expectations; some of the texts, for all their legalistic language, 
are only aspirational, while others are «law-in-the-books" rather than "law-in-
action." Still other texts are part ofthe "myth system" ofinternationallaw rather 
than its "operational code."2 
So although formal international legal texts can always be "crunched" in various 
logical exercises to reach desired "legal" conclusions, those conclusions may prove 
to be quite different from the expectations of lawfulness held by the actors whose 
expectations of lawfulness are actually relevant for a particu1ar mission. Th us, the 
international legal specialist who plays a role in the design of a military mission and 
who appreciates the relevance of the legal variable as a factor in the mission faces 
two daunting professional challenges: first, in identifying who are the politically 
relevant actors in a specific context, and, second, in articulating and analyzing their 
operative expectations of lawfulness. The key values held by important actors in 
the institutions of, and outside of, contemporary international law can be critical 
factors in the cost or feasibili ty of a particular military mission. In designing or ap-
praising missions against AI Qaeda, the collective views of the UN Security Coun-
cil, other governments and non-State entities form parts of the legal environment. 
AI Qaeda's agents and franchisees often operate across political boundaries and 
may be independent of or have only shadowy relations with governments or com-
ponents within them, instead deriving their support from non-governmental 
entities. 
I believe that Afghanistan, the central focus of this workshop, provides an in-
structive example of my thesis. Because my purpose is to illustrate the relations be-
tween mission design and international legal and institutional environments, a 
cursory review of the modern history of Afghanistan is necessary. 
II 
Afghanistan is divided along geographic and ethnic lines which do not configure its 
political borders. Neither its demographic divisions nor its topography dispose it 
to effective and centralized control or internal stab ility. Still Afghanistan enjoyed 
an extended period of stab ility in the reign ofZahir Shah, from 1933 to 1973. That 
tranquility ended when Zahir Shah was overthrown by his brother-in-law, who 
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terminated the monarchy and established a republic with, mirabile dictu, himself as 
its President. Five years later, he, in tum, was overthrown by the People's Demo· 
cratic Party (PDPA). Nur Mohammed Taraki became President, the republic was 
rechristened the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and closer relations with the 
Soviet Union were forged. The Soviet Army intelVened in Afghanistan in 1979 and 
installed Babrak Karmal in place ofTaraki. In terms of internaJ order, it was more 
on the order of a personnel change than a regime change, as the political vocabu-
lary and secular governmental program of Karmal's predecessor continued. 
President Carter had begun to fund and train Mujahidin through Pakistan's se-
cret selVice, the 151 (Inter-SelVices Intelligence agency), to fight the Soviet-backed 
government} The policy was continued under President Reagan. The Mujahidin 
were a largely religiously-inspired resistance. That said and without minimizing 
the mobilizing potential of Jihadist Islam, any attempt to depict or comprehend 
the war or Afghan politics, in general, in exclusively ideological, nationalistic or re-
ligious terms without accounting for ethnicity, language, region, the pursuit of 
wealth or simple bare-knuckle power politics would oversimplify a dauntingly 
complex political system. 
The Soviet occupation and the Afghan resistance cost the lives of over one mil-
lion and perhaps as many as two million Afghans; five million Afghans fled the 
country.~ When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, thesubtrac-
tion of the Soviet military from the Afghan equation did not produce the immedi-
ate collapse of the Najibullah government. The civil war continued. The factor that 
ultimately brought Dr. Najibullah down appears to have been the Soviet decision 
in 1992 to terminate the sale of petroleum to the Afghan government. 
Even after the collapse of the Najibullah government, the civil war ground on, 
with great loss of life; by then, much of the fighting was being carried on between 
various Mujahidin factions, who broke along language, ethnic and regional lines. 
Beginning in 1994, however, the Taliban, a fundamentalist Sunni and Pashtun 
force based in the south, emerged as a more unified element. The Taliban seized 
Kandahar and then Kabul in 1996 and by 2000 had captured 95 percent of the 
country.s The erstwhile Democratic Republic of Afghanistan morphed into the Is-
lamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized and main-
tained diplomatic relations with the Taliban as the legitimate government. Nor did 
the Taliban fare better at the United Nations, where the General Assembly'sCreden-
tials Committee refused to seat the Taliban government, despite its effective control 
of the country. Instead, the Committee accredited the representatives of the ousted 
government of President Rabbani, the leader of a Mujahidin faction, who was not re-
nowned for his commitment to secular vaJues or to democracy. 
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There is no indication that withholding certification at the United Nations had 
any effect on the Taliban's control of the country. Indeed, it was only in its 200 1 re-
port after "Operation Enduring Freedom"6 that the Credentials Committee took 
note of the agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan which the Secu-
rity Council had endorsed in Resolution 1383 (200 1).7 Thereupon, the Karzai gov-
ernment assumed the Afghan seat in the Assembly. Notwithstanding the potential 
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, it seems safe to say that the General Assembly's 
Credentials Committee was endorsing the regime change of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. 
Osama bin Laden's organization, AI Qaeda, had been born and nurtured on the 
borders of Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet Union's occupation, but 
AI Qaeda is not a political movement indigenous to Afghanistan. It was formed as 
part of a pan-Islamic military effort to force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. 
After the victory in 1989, AI Qaeda expanded its goals and relocated to Sudan. 
When AI Qaeda was subsequently expelled from Sudan as a result of US pressure, 
Osama bin Laden returned to and began to operate from Afghanistan. He estab-
lished training and operational bases and his operatives conducted significant ac-
tions, inter alia, against US installations and forces. Those latter actions appear to 
have been the principal reason why the Security Council began taking a renewed 
interest in Afghanistan. Let me turn to them briefly. 
In the late 1990s, though the General Assembly had refused to seat the Taliban 
government, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a special representative 
who was charged with negotiating a political settlement. Meanwhile, the Security 
Council sought to influence events in the Afghan civil war through various resolu-
tions which reflected different concerns. Security Council Resolution 1214 of De-
cember 8, 1998, for example, condemned many of the human rights violations of 
the Taliban but the Council registered, in particular, that it was "deeply disturbed by 
the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, 
for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts."6 In 
paragraph 13, the Council demanded "that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary 
and training for international terrorists and their organizations and that all Afghan 
factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice. ' '9 
A year later, the Council's fOCllS on AI Qaeda became sharper. It 
deplor[edl the fact that the Taliban continues to provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden 
and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist 
training camps from Taliban-controUed territory and to use Afghanistan as a base 
from which to sponsor international terrorist operations. 10 
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In 2000, the Council reiterated this language and continued by "strongly condemn-
ing the continuing use of [Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the 
Talibanl, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts 
.... "11 The Council determined that the failure of the Taliban to respond to the de· 
mands of paragmph 13 of Resolution 1214 and of pamgmph 2 of Resolution 1267 
of the preceding years now "constitute[d l a threat to international peace and secu· 
rity."12 Acting explicitly under Chapter VII, the Council essentially reiterated the 
demands which had been made in previous resolutions but also demanded that 
Osama bin Laden be surrendered either to the United States or to a country that 
would turn him over to the United States. The Council also imposed an array of 
economic sanctions in Resolution 1267, denying air access and freezing funds. A 
year later, in Resolution 1333 (2000), the Council reiterated its demands. At the 
end ofJuly 200 I , the Council ordered the Secretary·General to establish a monitor· 
ing mechanism for the implementation of all of the previous resolutions.13 
Together, these were the measures which the Security Council members were 
able to agree to take during that period. None prescribed by its sequence of resolu· 
tions appears to have had any effect on the Taliban's control and administmtion of 
Afghanistan or AI Qaeda's freedom of operation within or beyond its borders. 
Quite the contrary: only forty· three days after the last Council resolution, on Sep-
tember II , 200 I, AI Qaeda mounted its infamous attacks on civilian and military 
targets in the United States. 
The reaction of the Security Council on September 12, in Resolution 1368, is in· 
teresting and worth quoting in full, for its content tells much about the decision dy· 
namics of the Council, its capacity to respond effectively to such crises and, as a result, 
its potential to facilitate-and restrain-such military actions as the United States con· 
cluded were necessary for its defense. Resolution 1368 provides, in its entirety: 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming the principles and pwposes of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts, 
Recognizing the inherent right of individual or coUective self-defence in accordance 
with the Charter, 
1. Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks 
which took place on II September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and 
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Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat 
to international peace and security; 
2. Expresses its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families 
and to the people and Government of the United States of America; 
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible 
for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of 
these acts will be hdd accountable; 
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent 
and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full 
implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security 
Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999; 
5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations; 
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.l4 
You will note that the "combat by all means" statement in the second 
considerandum and the "all necessary steps" in operative paragraph 5 refer to the 
Security Council and not to any single State; the single State (obviously the United 
States) is confined, in the third considerandum, to self-defense. But bycharacteriz-
ing, in the second considerandum, terrorist acts as "threats to the peace" rather 
than "breaches of the peace" or "acts of aggression," the Resolution kept them 
from falling under Article 51's right of self-defense. l) As for the operative para-
graphs of the Resolution, the third calls fo r judicial action, while the fourth refers 
back to the various economic and other means adopted in the previous resolutions. 
But their lack of success was painfully manifest in the ruins still smoking thirty 
blocks south of Turtle Bay. 
On September 28, 2001, the Council revisited the problem in a somewhat calmer 
environment. Resolution 1373 (2001), again explicitly invoking Chapter VII, reiter-
ated the pre-9f11 judicial and economic strategies but added that "all States shall ... 
[tlake the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, induding by 
provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information."l" By No-
vember 14,2001 , Resolution 1378 could refer, if vaguely, to the Council's support 
for "international efforts to root out terrorism," l1 but it immediately made dear, as it 
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had earlier, that this was to be done "in keeping with the Charter of the United Na· 
tions."lll Those words are code for the Charter 's prohibition on the unilateral use of 
force in any circumstance other than exigent self-defense. But in this Resolution, the 
Council inserted, in its fo urth considerandum, an explicit condemnation of 
the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by 
the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and fo r providing safe haven to 
Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida and others associated with them, and in this context [the 
Council] support[s] the efforts of the Afghan people to repUu:e the Ta/iban regime.I9 
This was the first mention of an internationally approved regime change in Af-
ghanistan. But it would be more than overstatement to call this an a priori authori-
zation or an authentic UN initiative. By the time the Resolution was agreed, US 
Special Forces were operating in northern Afghanistan, actively assisting the 
Northern Alliance, and they would shortly be in Kabul, where a new government 
would be installed. As for the Taliban, they would withdraw from the capital and 
the other cities. They were no longer the de facto government of Afghanistan but 
were far from defeated as a military force. So the Council was, in effect, only con-
firming and acceding to (or participating in the fruits of) a fait accompli which had 
been accomplished without prior Council authorization. 
In Bonn, Germany, a conference, which brought together non -Taliban Afghans 
as well as warlords who had formerly been associated with the Taliban, was con-
vened, essentially by the United States. O n December 5, 2001, the conference con-
cluded the Bonn Agreement, which put in place provisional arrangements for a 
new government .2(1 Adaylater,on December 6, the Security Council, in Resolution 
1383, endorsed the Bonn Agreement, called on all Afghan groups to support the 
new government and declared itself willing to support it.2] On December 20, the 
Council, again , accommodated to rather than shaped events. In Resolution 1386, 
in effect, it acceded to the Bonn Agreement's request that the Council authorize an 
International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF; took note of the United King-
dom's willingness to organize and lead ISAF; and authorized ISAF to perform its 
mission in Afghanistan for 6 months.22 It has been renewed semiannually. 
III 
The purpose of this rapid diachronic review of the actions of the Security Council 
from the late 1990s to the end of2001 is not to belittle the contribution ofthe Secu-
rity Council or of the United Nations to the US response to the attacks by AI Qaeda. 
Quite the contrary! I believe that the United Nations is an important institution fo r 
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its member States and, when correctly and sensibly used, can be a critical instru-
ment of policy for the United States.23 But the United Nations is not a supple, mul-
tipurpose instrument that can be readily applied to all situations. The principles 
which the organization and its members value most-in particular national sover-
eignty, non -intervention and terri torial inviolability-and the idiosyncratic struc-
ture ofthe Security Council limit the organization's effectiveness in managing and 
resolving conflicts with aggressive global Salafism. Or, to formulate it in more posi-
tive terms, the way a military mission is designed may influence whether the Secu-
rity Council or, more generally, the United Nations will facili tate or constrain it; it 
may also determine the degree of that facilitation or obstruction . 
Prior to 200 I , the efforts of national actors who were threatened or were victims 
of AI Qaeda to work through the United Nations were oflittle effect. The problem 
was not that the Council's operational arsenal of diplomatic, economic and ideo-
logical instrwnents-which, after 1999, were even taken under its plenary Chapter 
VII powers-are inherently ineffective. In some cases, that arsenal has proved ef-
fective, either as a primary or adjunct instrument for securing desired political 
changes. The anti-Taliban sanctions might have worked over a vel)' long period of 
time, especially if some of the governments contiguous to Afghanistan had fully 
complied with and implemented them. 
The difficulty lies in that time factor. In the twenty-first century, governments, 
which anticipate the types of military attacks which actors such as AI Qaeda mount, 
cannot always afford the luxury of waiting for a very long period of time for Secu-
rity Council measures to "bite." The most noxious ofSalafist threats can operate on 
a much more accelerated timetable and with a greater potential fo r destructive 
impacts. 
This is, of course, what happened in the case of the Taliban and AI Qaeda. While 
the Council fine-tuned and patiently waited for its sanctions program to work, the 
Taliban government, amply supplied with illicit drug money and benefitting from 
either indifferent or actively sympathetic elements in some contiguous States, rein-
forced its control over Afghanistan; as fo r AI Qaeda, comfortably cocooned in the 
Taliban system, it pursued its various programs, culminating in its operations on 
September II . 
The Un ited Nations is neither world politics nor even its major arena; it is a 
part of it, a composite actor within it. Assessing the effectiveness of the UN role in 
this phase of the Afghan war requires us to look at the broader arena of world pol-
itics. There, what appears to have happened is that after September 11, the United 
States and those States cooperating with it, perforce, took their own initiatives. As 
for the other less supportive but indispensable members of the Security Council, 
they accommodated themselves to what appeared to be a fait accompli, trading a 
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measure of Council authorization, by retrospective stamp o f approval, in return 
for the validation of the Council's own relevance and a nominal share o f supervi· 
sion. In the coin of international political exchange, that validation was worth 
something. 
But the Security Council does not control the market on international author-
ity. It may not always deny lawfulness to an action by withholding its seal of ap-
proval; conversely, its seal of approval does not always assure that the actions in 
question will be viewed as lawfu1 by other politically relevant actors in the interna-
tional system. This is especially the case when the action involves invading and dis-
placing an existing government-hence the tepid Security Council efforts prior to 
9/1 1 and the limited authorizations (usually coming after the fact) thereafter. 
I V 
One of the lessons for the fut ure here appears to be that where urgent action against 
entities like AI Qaeda and its affiliates is required, the responses which may, at the 
most, be expected from the Securi ty Council-the sorts of measures ordered by the 
Council in the period before September I I, 200 I-will not be sufficient in real 
time; in these circumstances, unilateral and, by its nature, anticipatory military ac-
tion may be the only meaningfu1 option. A confirmation of the international law-
fulness of such unilateral action by the Security Council and the more diffuse 
international processes of decision shou1d be sought. But it is not likely that such 
action, even when plausibly construed as a form of self-defense, will be authorized 
in advance by the Security Council or confirmed or celebrated after the fact. It ap-
pears clear, however, that the more ambitious, extensive and ant i-governmental 
the unilateral action undertaken, the less likely will be Security Council or more 
general international support. 
For the reasons set out in Part I, one of the considerations in the design of a uni-
lateral action which a State feels it must take in either reactive or anticipatory self-
defense24 should be to increase its international legal acceptability and to decrease 
perceptions of the violation of international law. I would suggest that this be done 
even if addressing these considerations means ultimately that a less efficacious mil-
itary action will be mounted. Missions which are designed so that they can be ac-
complished rather quickly, if unlikely to win formal and informal internat ional 
approval, are more likely to provoke less, and less intense, international disap-
proval. By contrast,longer-term missions and, as I will explain in a moment, occu-
pations will require international authorization and even if it does not erode, it 
may not be an assurance of success. 
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Thus, consideration of the legal perspective I sketched a moment ago leads to a 
general recommendation: where possible, narrow the focus of the mission to the 
neutralization or degrading of the specific terrorist threat and not to a regime 
change of the government which has selVed as the cocoon of the terrorist group. 
v 
Unquestionably, transforming a regime which is providing refuge and a launching 
pad for a terrorist group into a regime "enduring freedom" is a more comprehen-
sive solution than simply degrading the capacities of the terrorist group itself. But 
aside from the formidable operational difficulties in effecting a regime change, 
which I have considered eisewhere,2s planners cannot ignore the intense interna-
tional political and legal resistance which a military mission of this sort will 
provoke. 
A military action against a specific noxious target within a State is a fini te and tem-
porally limited military rather than an extended counterinsurgency action; with all 
the controversy it may excite (and I will consider it in a moment), it will still be less 
internationally controversial than an action to change the entire regime within the 
State.26 If the jurisprudence of the International Court is taken as a reliable indica-
tor of what formal international law currently considers lawful self-defense, the law 
of self-defense appears to be limited to response to and neutralization of an imme-
diate threat,21 and even within those narrow parameters, international appraisals 
of lawfulness may vary. 
Contrast, first, the international legal reactions to the Clinton administration's 
periodic aerial actions against Iraqi air defenses with the objective confined to "de-
grading" them; and, second, the international legal reaction to the US invasion of 
Iraq in order to change the regime. Or, to take a rather wild hypothetical scenario, 
imagine the contrasting reactions to (1) unilaterailSAF or Afghan military action 
against AI Qaeda or Taliban bases in the frontier areas of Pakistan and (ii ) unilat-
eral ISAF military action to change the Pakistani government because elements 
high in the government or in lSI were believed to be supporting the Taliban or AI 
Qaeda. 
Afghanistan, I concede, presented a difficult case fo r military planners. In 200 I, 
AI Qaeda was effectively integrated in the Ministry of Defense of the Taliban gov-
ernment. But I am not sure that even this overlap required conflating the Taliban 
and AI Qaeda or that it precluded the United States from characterizing the adver-
sary as AI Qaeda, reselVing for the Taliban government the status of an obstacle to 
reaching the actual enemy, rather than an indistinguishable part of the enemy. 
Once AI Qaeda and the Taliban were conflated, however, and Afghan regime 
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change became an ineluctable part of the mission, it was no longer possible to con· 
centrateefforts on AI Qaeda; significant resources had to be diverted from the neu· 
tralization of AI Qaeda to creating and shoring up another Afghan government and 
then protecting it from the Taliban. In that difficult process, military planners had 
to accommodate the full range of civil, political and human rights standards of 
contemporary international law, which are demanded with ever greater intensity 
through myriad governmental and non-governmental channels. Regime change is 
perforce a comprehensive program and brings into the decision process a wide 
range of non-governmental organizations, insisting on objectives which, however 
worthy, detract from the prosecution ofa more-focused military action; the more-
focused military action would bring in far fewer and more-focused demands. 
VI 
A brief digression: Perhaps a more realistic understanding of how daunting a mis-
sion regime change is, especially in Afghanistan, might have led to a more focused 
military objective. A contemporary essay on Afghanistan appearing in the most 
popular online encyclopedia states: 
Once in power, the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] moved to pennit 
freedom of religion and carried out an ambitious land reform, waiving fanners' debts 
countrywide. They also made a number of statements on women's rights and 
introduced women to political life. A prominent example was Anahita Ratebzad ... 
who wrote the famous New Kabul Times editorial which declared: "Privileges which 
women, by right, must have are equal education, job security, health services. and free 
time to rear a healthy generation for building the future of the country . . . educating 
and enlightening women is now the subject of dose government attention."28 
Incidentally, the online essay is not referring to the contemporary government of 
President Hamid Karzai but rather to the regime ofTaraki, Amin, and Najibullah 
of the PDPA, the government which was then supported by the Soviet Union. 
The essay from which I was reading a moment ago continues: 
The majority of people in the cities including Kabul either welcomed or were 
ambivalent to these policies. However, the secular nature of the government made it 
unpopular with religiously conservative Afghans in the villages and the countryside, 
who favou red traditionalist "Islamic" restrictions on women's rights and in daily life.29 
Does it sound familiar? 
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Ronald Neumann, formerly the US ambassador in Kabul, reported that a recent 
poll taken in Afghanistan indicated that 55 percent of the respondents wanted the 
United States to remain.30 That figure would be decisive in a normal civil situation 
where votes decide. But in a belligerent situation, it is raw power that decides. And 
ifI may hazard an opinion, I would suggest that the balance of power in Afghani-
stan tilts in favor of the conservatizing and not the secularizing elements. More-
over, the relevant eli te of the critical contiguous State most disposed to invest 
resources in trying to influence developments in Afghanistan also appears to tilt to-
ward the conservatizing clements. 
The would-be regime changer should bear in mind that, once such a mission is 
embarked upon, if military efforts prove indeterminative at acceptable cost levels, 
political solutions will have to be sought. In Afghanistan, a political solution would 
have to involve the Taliban. At a minimum, it would have to include some role in 
power for the Taliban in return for their commitment neither to host nor to sup-
port AI Qaeda. This would enable the United States to concentrate its resources on 
AI Qaeda. That could have been the principal objective of the mission from the 
outset. 
I have taxed you with this little excursus from the subject of international law 
and expectations of international lawfulness to emphasize that outside powers, if 
they are willing to invest very great resources, could be influential factors in the 
Afghan political and military drama. But even then, the o utside efforts could well 
prove indecisive, for Afghanistan is locked in its own historical process. 
VII 
I have recommended, from the standpoint of international law, the virtues of a 
"less-is-more" approach to the design of missions when international expectations 
oflawfulness appear unlikely to support a broader mission. But, in contexts like Af-
ghanistan, is "less" really likely to be more acceptable to the institutions and jury-
men of international law? In the context of Afghanistan and its unique 
geographical factors, can unilateral actions directed against entities like AI Qaeda, 
nesting in another State, ever be lawful? And how can one prospectively assess what 
expectations of lawfulness for such an action are likely to be? 
I do not intend to crunch the familiar texts on the use of force but rather to focus 
on operative expectations of lawfulness. I quote from an online report of the Asso-
ciated Press (AP) on June 15,2008. 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened Sunday to send Afghan troops across the 
border to fight militants in Pakistan, a forceful warning to insurgents and the Pakistani 
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government that his country is fed up with cross-border attacks. Karzai said that in 
recent fighting in Helmand province, where hundreds of US marines have been 
battling insurgents for the last two months, most of the fighters came from Pakistan. 31 
Of interest to US is that President Karzai indicated that he believes that what he is 
threatening is a form of lawful self-defense. He stated that "Afghanistan has the 
r ight to self-defense, and because militants cross over from Pakistan 'to come and 
kill Afghan and kill coalition troops, it exactly gives us the right to do the same." '32 
Karzai even threatened targeted assassinations in Pakistan of Baitullah Mehsud, 
the Taliban leader in Pakistan, and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan and de facto head of State from 1996 to 2001. 
Pakistan's reaction to Karzai's statement (and, of course, it is not the first time 
he has made it) was interesting. YousufRaza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, 
insisted, according to the Associated Press, on Pakistani sovereignty over its terri-
tory but said that "the Afghan-Pakistan border is too long to prevent people from 
crossing, 'even if Pakistan puts its entire army along the border. "'33 In the mean-
while, he said that Pakistan "is seeking peace deals with mili tants in its borders, in-
cluding with Mehsud.".34 This particular Pakistani initiative has concerned the 
United States, the AP contin ues, "[b lut Pakistan insists it's not negotiating with 
' terrorists,' but rather with militants willing to lay down their arms."35 Baitullah 
Mehsud seems to see it differently. He, the AP adds, "has said he would continue 
to send fi ghters to battle US forces in Afghanistan even as he seeks peace with 
Pakistan."36 
And, one might add, he is not puffing. The Associated Press reports that "U.$. 
and NATO commanders say that following the peace agreements [between the 
Taliban and Pakistan I this spr ing, attacks have risen in the eastern area of Afghani-
stan along the border. "37 
NATO's ISAF declined to comment on Karzai's statement b ut unnamed US of-
ficials were willing to weigh in, on condition of anonymity. I quote their statement: 
U.S. officials have increased their warnings in recent weeks that the Afghan conflict will 
drag on fo r years unless militant safe havens in Pakistan are taken out. Military officials 
say counterinsurgency campaigns are extremely difficult to win when militants have 
safe areas where they can train, recruit and stockpile supp1ies.38 
No one who has studied counterinsurgency will contest that. The Malayan 
Emergency, which is the poster child of successful counterinsurgencies-and 
which, incidentally, required three hundred thousand British and other troops and 
twelve years-was conducted in a peninsula whose surrounding waters could be 
controlled by the Bri tish; there was no contiguous friendly or passive State to 
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provide safe redoubts like those available to the Taliban and AI Qaeda in the border 
areas of Pakistan. Moreover, the insurgents were racially distinct from the majori ty 
population. And the British public supported the mission. 
In August 2007, Senator Sarack Obama said, in a speech delivered in Washing-
ton: "If we have actionable intelligence about high-vaJue terrorist targets and Presi-
dent Musharrafwon't act, we will."39 The claim of a right of "hot pursuit," even in 
maritime confrontations, is controversial. In the I'm Alot/e arbitration,40 the right 
of pursuit was treaty-based and, hence, applied only to US and UK flag vessels. 
Moreover, it applied only to pursuit within one hour's sailing time of territorial 
waters. So the tribunal's holding, which is not distinguished by its coherence, re-
lates to treaty interpretation rather than a pronouncement of customary interna-
tionallaw. 
Even more controversial is the claim of a right of hot pursuit across terrestrial 
borders. In terms of theory, the UN Charter obviates terrestrial hot pursuit, for the 
only unilateral action available to a State is self-defense against an armed attack; 
once the adversary has fled the attacked State's territory, the right of self-defense 
would exhaust itself. In theory, furthe r prosecuting action that had commenced as 
legitimate self-defense might itself degenerate into an armed attack. 
International politics and the use of the military instrument as part of it have 
proved to be more complicated than the simple theory of the Charter. Instances of 
hot pursuit of an adversary which has entered your terri tory as well as anticipatory 
interdiction of an enemy force sheltering in the contiguous territory of another 
State have been occurring. While the State whose territory has been invaded has al-
most always (there are some exceptions) issued a protest, it is harder to conclude 
that the internationaJlegal system, as a whole, has unequivocally condemned each 
of these pursuits or generally condemned all such actions in all circumstances. To 
take examples only from this at/t/us mirabilis, consider (I) the Turkish pursuit of 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party in northern Iraq, (ii) the Colombian pursuit of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in northern Ecuador and (iii) President 
Karzai's threat to send Afghan troops into Pakistan in pursuit of Taliban there. 
What was the operative judgment as to international lawfulness in these cases? 
What sanction was applied, if transgression there was? 
Consider the paradigmatic problem of which the war in Afghanistan is a prime 
example: irregular non-State forces shelter in an uncontrolled area of State A from 
which they regularly conduct lethal raids into State B and then withdraw to the 
safety of State A. According to the International Court, the actions of the irregular 
forces are not deemed to fulfill the "armed attack" requirement of Article 51 ofthe 
Charter. Consequently, even if the Court were to expand its conception of the 
scope of self-defense so that it was available against non-State entities, State B may 
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not respond with military force. State B is confined to bringing the matter to the 
Security Council. Assume that State B does bring the matter to the Security Coun· 
cil for ten consecutive attacks and, in each instance, the Security Council issues a 
resolution, condemning the attacks and ordering State A to act to prevent them. 
The attacks continue. 
At a certain point, State B will enter the areas of State A where the irregulars shel· 
ter and seek to kill or capture them. Will the international community, through its 
various decision processes, condemn and effectively sanction the action? 
The international legal system can speak with great subtlety and nuance. In 
Corfu CI,annei,41 the International Court of Justice condemned the United King-
dom for having entered Albanian waters without the Albanian government's con· 
sent. It held that this condemnation was itself sufficient sanction and allowed the 
evidence which had been improperly seized to be admitted. My estimation of the 
situation with respect to cross· border pursuit is that there will always be a formal 
condemnation because of national pride and concern for the erosion of the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity but there will only be meaningful and sanction-related 
condemnations by the international decision processes in those cases in which the 
cross· border action is deemed to have been unnecessary, disproportionate or in 
violation of the differentiation principle. 
It is, of course, by the application of these criteria that the law of war has tradi· 
tionally assessed the lawfulness of actions in new situations. Whether the UN Secu· 
ri ty Council or the International Criminal Court will look at it that way remains to 
be seen. But even a condemnation of an internationally unauthorized military ac· 
tion in another State which does not affect that State's territory or political inde· 
pendence will be less severe than a condemnation for a temporally extended and 
vigorously resisted regime cbange. 
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